INTRODUCTION
Over 15 years ago, a fair amount of controversy was created in the attempts by some (Germanic) tribunals applying the CISG to introduce more predictability in to the difficult issues of determining what "reasonable time" should be for notice giving under Article 39 of the CISG. The notion of a "noble month" was introduced to English academic scholarship in 1997. That 1 term was originally transposed from Ingeborg Schwenzer's "großzügigen Monat" from the Van Caemerer/Schlectriem commentary (in the days before we had the benefit of this important book in English), and was subsequently 2 given a seal of approval by Professor Schwenzer. The notion became popular 3 in case law from some regions of the CISG; but while a number of cases sprang up confirming the need for more predictability in this area, a number of commentators as well as the CISG Advisory Council distanced themselves from the notion of any benchmark for determining reasonable time. The scene for a battle between flexible uncertainty and more rigid predictability seemed set. I think it fair to say that a certain timidity has dominated the subject in recent years in academia, and that case law has fragmented itself into regional approaches which belie the uniform nature of the CISG as it was intended. This paper will analyse the benchmark of the "Noble Month" by charting its success, contextualising its difficulties, and analysing the Article 39 cases from the German courts whence it sprang, to ascertain whether it is still alive and kicking, if it has been laid to rest or-perhaps more controversially-whether it should have been laid to rest. THE RISE OF THE "NOBLE MONTH"-1995 TO 2004 As mentioned, the notion originated in Schwenzer's comparative analysis of transnational domestic timeframes for notice giving in the original German von Caemerer CISG commentary edited by Professor Peter Schlechtriem in 1995. After looking at French, American and German notification 4 frameworks, Schwenzer concludes that: "Will man allzu großen Auslegungsdivergenzen vorbeugen, erscheint eine Annäherung der Standpunkte unabdingbar. Als grobem Mittelwert sollte man deshalb wenigstens von ca. einem Monat ausgehen." In the English version of the text, this has since been translated as: "if excessive differences in interpretation are to be prevented, it would appear that a convergence of views is crucial. Consequently a period of approximately one month should at least be adopted as a rough average." 5 This solution makes perfect sense in theory. The consequence of failing to give the required notice of non-conformity is a complete lack of remedy (subject to some rarely applied exceptions in Articles 40 and 44), so it is of crucial importance to parties in any dispute regarding non-conforming goods. Add to that the fact that transnational case law shows a deplorable tendency to adopt more homeward trends in deciding what a reasonable time should be, 6 and we have a serious potential pitfall for the unwary business man, with timeframes ranging from six months being on time and a few days being too median timeframe gleaned from a diversity of jurisdictions represented a sound attempt at creating a more predictable approach to Article 39, which is exactly the kind of increased predictability that commercial practice welcomes.
The concept of a "Noble Month" is not to be taken too literally as always being one month. It is intended as a yardstick, an outer framework of one month for notification, which can then be altered depending on the specific factors concerning the goods: perishability, seasonable nature, etc. At least to this Civil Law trained mind-which may arguably be fonder of predictability than unpredictable flexibility-this would seem to be a significant advantage over utter uncertainty.
Following Schwenzer's suggestion, it was not long before the "Noble Month" surfaced in judicial court practice. With its predilection towards reverence for, and reference to, leading scholarship, the German Supreme Court cited Schwenzer in 1995. The German Supreme Court applied the "Noble Month" to the well-known case of cadmium-infested mussels where notice had not been given. They transposed the one month timeframe, and 9 stated that "Selbst wenn man insoweit nach Auffassung des erkennenden Senats sehr großzügig wegen der unterschiedlichen nationalen Rechtstraditionen von einem 'groben Mittelwert' von etwa einem Monat ausgehen wollte, war die Rügefrist vor dem 3 März 1992 abgelaufen," with reference to Schwenzer whom they were paraphrasing. So-even if the very generous timeframe of about one month as a median value of differing national notification rules were applied, notice was still not timely. This seemed to indicate that even though the Supreme Court considered a timeframe for notice of one month very generous ("sehr großzügig"), they were willing to consider it a new benchmark for the measuring of Article 39 timeframes. And of course, once this approach was rubber-stamped by the Supreme Court, other German courts soon followed, with reference to the Supreme Court, where it has been held that one week for examination and four weeks for giving notice is the common approach, affirming a decision from a lower instance.
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The German Supreme Court went on, in 1999, to enter a decision which 12
Schwenzer herself rightly called "striking." It referred to the "Noble Month" 13 as its regular or normal timeframe for measuring Article 39, and found that a total period of seven weeks after delivery (allowing three weeks for examination and four weeks for notice giving) was timely, even though this was essentially a recalculation of all the timeframes involved in examination and notification. Notice had been given within a few days of discovery of the non-conformity, but examination had been tardy. Bluntly put, the Court was essentially using formalistic timeframes to post-rationalise the decision to find in favour of the buyer. While the Court must be commended for departing from previous domestically-based interpretations where a week or two would normally not be considered timely, as well as for their distinction of the two timeframes of Articles 38 and 39, this case does not represent an entirely 14 healthy swing at the problematic ball of Article 39 timeframes. The Court's rigid application of the doctrine as "regular" ("regelmässig") in this context stretches it too far; reliance on a standard timeframe in this way belies the existence of the "Noble Month" as a flexible yardstick which takes into account all circumstances, and may well be seen to sacrifice flexibility on the altar of certainty. One might even say that in the effort to formulate a predictable and certain timeframe, the Supreme Court has not only been "striking," but has struck out. the "Noble Month" by finding that notice given almost two months after initial test results is not timely, it does so by affirming a lower instance which prescribes a general duty of two weeks, with no mention of the "Noble Month" doctrine which it has previously so [over-]strenuously supported. If seen in isolation, this may seem immaterial. But the lower Court's reference to a standard two week timeframe-which has been a competing timeframe benchmark in other cases, as well as the leading one in Austria-is repeated in the Supreme Court's judgment and is not dismissed or even disputed. This could be construed as the German Supreme Court backing away from a guideline that is not used internationally and is therefore not appropriate.
There are subsequent lower instances that affirm the "Noble Month," but the It is therefore worthwhile to take a good look at more recent German case law as a whole, in the determination of the current state of the "Noble Month" doctrine in Germany and its potential longevity.
NOBILITY AT HOME, 2005 AND ONWARDS Given the lack of reasoning on the omission of its own "Noble Month" doctrine offered by the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the 2004 BGH case above represents a distancing from the doctrine or not. Given this fact, it is difficult to see how this may have influenced the doctrine in subsequent case law.
German law is not subject to strict stare decisis. Lower instances can depart from a guideline set out in a Supreme Court ruling, if prepared to risk scholarly criticism and successful appeals. And even before 2004, it was clear that this was happening, as the "Noble Month" was experiencing a very varied success. An analysis of all German cases involving Article 39 reported after the disputed 2004 BGH case above may therefore not be indicative of how the Supreme Court's reasoning on this point is perceived by its own lower courts. But it will be an indication of how the German Courts are dealing with this problematic issue, and just how much influence the "Noble Month" is enjoying. The following looks at cases decided in Germany after the 2004 BGH case was judged. For simplicity in avoiding specific cut-off dates that will rarely be indicative of the availability of the 2004 BGH case as a source of law, I have chosen to look at cases from 2005 and onward reported in the Kritzer Database. These can be categorised in 3 basic groups: 19 1) Cases from Germany judged after 2005 which are not incompatible with the "Noble Month" as developed by the German Supreme Court, but do not lend it obvious support; 2) Cases from Germany judged after 2005 which-at least in appearance-distance themselves from the "Noble Month" doctrine as applied by the German Supreme Court, either by being incompatible with it, or by advocating another benchmark for measuring the timeframe of Art. 39; and 3) Cases from Germany judged after 2005 that embrace the "Noble Month" doctrine as developed by the German Supreme Court clearly. The two other categories, however, merit a closer look. In the second category, one case from Frankfurt seems incompatible with the "Noble Month" doctrine of the Supreme Court, and one from Hamburg bears a label claiming it is. In the third category, I have found four cases which clearly support the doctrine. These are outlined below.
The Frankfurt case from category two concerns used shoes, and 20 essentially hinges on examination of goods rather than notice giving, much like the 1999 BGH case above. The shoes in question were delivered in a "bad and unhygienic condition," but this was not noticed until three weeks after delivery, when examination took place. Notice was then given immediately, the day after. The Court reasoned that such an immediately discernible non-conformity should have been discovered much sooner and then immediately enforced the sanction of Article 39 for this breach of Article 38. This judgement is interesting because of what the Court does NOT do. The Court does NOT follow the precedent set by the Supreme Court in 1999 in a very similar scenario. The Court does NOT construct a fictitious date for when it considers the notice requirement triggered by Article 38, and then add on the period for notice giving to reach an acceptable final time for notice. It does NOT use a rigid construction of a doctrine to mathematically formulate a solution in support of the buyer. If it had followed that 1999 precedent and its "Noble Month" construction as standard, then it should have reasoned that, at the earliest, Article 39 would have been breached one month after delivery, if examination under the separate timeframe of Article 38 was set to be carried out on the same day. There are no extraneous factors in this case requiring shorter timeframes for notice-no seasonal affiliation for the goods, no unstable financial market for the goods, and no perishables involved. But this case does the opposite of the Supreme Court in 1999. And that raises an interesting point: this case may not follow the "Noble Month" as it was interpreted by German Supreme Court. But it is not a "bad" judgement, to coin an overly simplistic descriptor. The Court demonstrates awareness of the need to apply the CISG outside the influence of domestic law by quoting Schwenzer in acknowledgement that the notification timeframes under the CISG are more generous than those of the German domestic law. Moreover, 21 considering the criticism for formalistic interpretation which the 1999 BGH case can be subject to above, it is perhaps better to allow a more direct sanctioning of a failure to examine properly, in a case where the buyer demonstrated that swift communication and notice was possible (by giving it the next day after discovery). Had the Court followed the 1999 precedent, the buyers notice would have been timely, despite the fact that examination was clearly delayed and notice could (and was) given within a day. The reasoning in this case does seem more palatable. And although this case departs from the "Noble Month" doctrine as the German Supreme Court have applied it, is it really so hostile to way it was originally envisioned by Schwenzer? While it is true the Article 38 is not independently sanctioned, and should not be, a poor examination procedure could nevertheless be one of the overall factors of a case that can be looked at in determining whether the sanction in Article 39 should apply. Such a consideration would not be outside the scope of the "Noble Month" as it was designed, in looking at all the circumstances of a case, and being a flexible benchmark rather than a doctrine. The Hamburg case, which has been mistaken for a category two case, involves inventory for a Café, more specifically allegedly non-conforming machines for the production of ice cream. This case is cited in the With respect to the examination and notification in terms of Articles 38 and 39 CISG, the preceding jurisprudence usually applied a time limit of about fourteen days, up to a maximum of one month after receipt of the goods, except where particular circumstance must be considered which may lead to a shorter or longer period.
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The court made reference to Magnus AND to Schwenzer, both of whom are cited in the "preceding jurisprudence" so loosely referred to. So, despite the label in Internationales Handelsrecht, this case is not incompatible with the Noble Month, and it belongs in the first category with the other seventeen cases, as a typical Article 39 case, which is of no use in an analysis of Article 39 timeframes. It referred loosely to some "Noble Month" case law, alongside that of a competing doctrine, but the outcome was ultimately determined by a completely different aspect of Article 39. That leaves us with the cases that clearly support the "Noble Month" doctrine. Of these four cases, two are from 2006 and two are from 2009. More importantly, three concern non-perishable goods; respectively T-Shirts, cars and a printing machine. One concerns perishable goods, namely plants. They all refer to the general standard of one month for notice giving.
The case on perishables, live plants, is from Bamberg. In this case, the 26 buyer wrote a comprehensive letter, detailing most aspects of the problems with the live plants three days after delivery, and also took out reservation on the delivery documents as he was concerned about their appearance. While such a notice would be timely under any doctrine or ideology, as it is arguable instantaneous, the buyer raised an additional issue during the proceedings which he had not notified the seller of. The Court took the correct view that the buyer be barred from raising this during the proceeding, several years after the defect. In doing so, the Court refers to the notice timeframe thus: "notice of non-conformity must be given in the applicable time period of not more than one month after delivery," with reference to the original BGH case 27 utilising the "Noble Month." The Court does not further qualify how the timeframe in this case ought to have been briefer due to the perishable nature of the goods-but nor does it have to. The entire mention of the "Noble Month" and Article 39(1) is somewhat of an obiter dictum, as the cut-off rule in Article 39(2) would apply anyway to bar any claim for a non-latent defect almost five years after the delivery of the goods. What is interesting is the choice of precedent. The Court here refers solely to the 1995 Supreme Court Case, and does not list others. Of course, the 1995 Mussels case is a more famous one, and the one that springs easily to mind in this context because it introduced the doctrine into German law. I may be reaching here, but the failure to refer to the more recent use of the doctrine could also be interpreted as a conscious choice not to lend weight to this particular case. Perhaps others would agree with me in the over-stretching of the doctrine in this case. Or perhaps I am seeing phantoms. My phantom-viewing is, however, reinforced by another case from Koblenz.
This case, from 2006, concerns T-shirts and also solely refers to the 28 1995 Mussels case in support of the fact that:
The period of time regarded as reasonable under Article 39 CISG must be seen in the particular circumstances of the case. Perishable or seasonal goods must be discerned. In general, however, an average of about one month after the goods have or ought to have been discovered the defect ought to be regarded as reasonable.
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It is nice to note the specific obiter consideration for perishable goods and the inherent flexibility of the timeframe here. The goods in this case were not perishable, and notice was given within six days of delivery. Although arguably a notice that would fit any competing doctrine or ideology of Article 39 as timely, the reference to the "Noble Month" as the state of law is contradict its ethos, on closer scrutiny, but there are more than a few which do. And there are none that favour a competing doctrine. So, although the "Noble Month" has not been affirmed by the German Supreme Court for a decade, the Supreme Court has entered a decision not incompatible with it, and the lower Courts seem to clearly favour it as a benchmark. And, perhaps more importantly, since 2005 there have been no reported instances of very short Germanic-style timeframes in operation under Article 39-in other words, no more homeward trend of German domestic law influencing Article 39. Glorious.
In influencing the German Court system away from their previous practices, where they were demonstrably influenced by domestic law in their interpretation of the CISG, Schwenzer indubitably made her mark on German CISG case law on Article 39. This is a fine feather in her hat, as well as a credit to adaptability of German Courts in recognizing the need to distinguish the CISG form domestic law thinking. In facilitating this, the "Noble Month" has been a true aristocrat.
But, of course, the true test of the "Noble Month" is not on the German home front alone, but rather on the international arena as a whole. If this blueprint-however international in design-is only utilised in Germany, it will still not advance a unified transnational yardstick for measuring Article 39; it would represent a different form of homeward trend in reliance on scholarship and a single mentality towards determining a more predictable timeframe, shared only by some Germanic legal systems. So, armed with relative success of the "Noble Month" in Germany today, let us take a more sobering look at its international context.
DIFFERING MENTALITIES-TO EACH HIS OWN?
As evidenced above, the whole point of needing an amalgamation of timeframes was to stop an increasing diversification in setting of timeframes under Article 39 transnationally. The root of these differences lay-and lies-in the differing attitudes in various domestic laws to the role of, and thus the length of, time frames for notice-giving. Previous scholarship has expanded on this from a comparative perspective, and found different domestic laws in place, which influence the timeframe. And there is no 35 35. See Andersen, supra note 1. Sections II and IV look at the notification rules of Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark and the US. from 2006 should only be looking at these older cases, which represent a trend that has been more or less steadily reversed over the proceeding eleven years. In this case, the reliance on out-dated case law was caused by solely referring to an old textbook and not actually looking at cases-one may well blame legal counsel for that. But what happens here is one (outdated) homeward trend frightening another into following its own homeward trend because the solution is not commonly palatable. Secondly, while it is true that foreign decision do not bind any domestic Court, the duty to look at foreign precedents remains, based on comity.
The reasoning is, however, not overly surprising. A search of all reported CISG cases on Article 39 from the United States has failed to turn up a single one referring to the "Noble Month" or a comparable reasoning that strikes a compromise with other legal systems. The Anglo-American mentality as demonstrated here, is clearly not embracing a comparative approach, or attempting to formulate a more predictable guideline for this notice. And it will wonder why it should-law is in the business of solving disputes, not creating doctrine with which it may lock itself in under a system of binding precedents.
This stands in stark contrast to the Germanic legal mentality, which seems to be always looking for doctrines and certainties in its approach. It is not just the "Noble Month" which has become subject to the ravenous appetite for predictability and doctrine in the interpretation of the Article 39 timeframe. In Austria, Article 39 is subject to a general rule of two weeks for giving notice. And in Germany, there is evidence of an attempt to formulate a 49 further specific doctrine for perishable goods, in two separate cases from 2006 and 2009. In a case from Köln concerning potatoes, the court refers to an accepted doctrine that perishables be examined and notice given within
